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APPROX IM ATIO NS OF BELIEVEABILITY FUNCTIONS 
U N D E R I N C O M P L E T E IDENTIFICATION OF SETS 
OF COMPATIBLE STATES 
IVAN KRAMOSIL 
The believeability function has been introduced and investigated in the Dempster-Shafer 
theory as a numerical characteristic of uncertainty ascribing to each set of possible answers 
to a question, or set of possible states of an investigated system, under another interpre-
tation, the probability with which the obtained random empirical data (observations) are 
such that the true answer, or the actual state of the system, can be proved to belong to the 
set in question. In other words, this value is defined by the probability that the set of all 
answers or states compatible with the at random obtained data is a subset of the set the 
believeability of which is to be defined. In this paper we shall investigate the case when the 
set of compatible states cannot be completely defined so that we have at hand just a class 
jf sets of answers or states containing the set of compatible states. Using this class of sets, 
we shall define and compute an approximation of the desired value of the believeability 
function, which can be useful in some decision-making problems when not the value of this 
function itself, but rather the fact whether this value exceeds some threshold value or not 
is important. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Dempster-Shafer (D.-S., abbreviately) approach to uncertainty quantification and 
processing or, as it is often called, D.-S. theory, has been developed since the last 
more than twenty years (the basic Dempster 's paper [1] originates from 1967) and 
represents, in our days, an interesting mathematical model which can be seen, from 
the purely formal point of view, as a non-traditional application of probability theory, 
but which offers interpretations going out of the frameworks of the usual interpreta-
tions of the probability theory. The aim of this paper is to modify the mathematical 
apparatus of the D.-S. theory in order to be able to express formally some ideas 
generalizing and weakening the assumptions of the original D.-S. way of reasoning. 
So, it would be quite sufficient to restrict ourselves to the very simple abstract pres-
entation of the D.-S. theory as will be introduced in Chapter 2 below, and to kindly 
invite the reader to consult very numerous and easily accessible references as far as 
the motivation, philosophical and methodological background, interpretations and 
applications of the D.-S. theory are concerned. Nevertheless, aiming to present the 
intended generalization of the D.-S. theory not only as a mat ter of purely mathe-
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matical speculation but also as an effort motivated by certain rather deeply going 
philosophical and methodological reasons, we take as useful to introduce here, very 
briefly, a way of reasoning leading to the D.-S. theory and to an intuitive interpre-
tation of this theory. 
Consider a system the nature of which (technical, biological, ecological, . . .) is 
irrelevant for our purposes and which is situated in just one internal state so, called 
the actual s tate of the system and belonging to a nonempty set S of potential 
internal states of the system. The system works or developes in an environment 
and this environment is situated in just one state u>0, called the actual state of 
the environment, or the actual elementary state, belonging to a nonempty set fi of 
possible states of the environment (elementary states). Hence, the assumption of 
closed world is accepted as far as the system in question as well as the environment 
are concerned. The relation between the environment and the system is deterministic 
in the sense that so is strictly determined by ui0, in symbols, there exists a function 
(total) a* defined on Q and taking its values in S (a* : Q —*• S, abbreviately) such 
tha t a* (to) is the actual state of the system supposing tha t UJ is the actual elementary 
state, in particular, a*(u0) = s0 by definition. 
The aim of the user (observer, investigator) of the system in question is to iden-
tify the actual state so of the system or at least to answer, correctly, the question 
whether the relation s0 e T holds or does not hold for a nonempty proper subset 
T of S, T being, as a rule, the set of states of the investigated system possessing a 
property important or interesting because of some reasons connected with an intend-
ed application of the system. However, neither so nor ui0 are directly observable, so 
that the only possibility is to obtain some partial information about them indirect-
ly. Namely, the user of the system can obtain some empirical data concerning the 
system and the environment (observations, measurements, results of experiments), 
formally expressed by a value X from the space E of possible empirical values. This 
space E may be also a vector space to cover the possibility of more observations, 
measurements, etc. taken altogether. So, if E = X"_1E'j, then, e.g. some E{ may 
be two-element (say, zero-one) spaces to express the results of qualitative obser-
vations and experiments ( ye s -no , ho lds -does not hold), other E^s may be real 
lines or appropriate intervals of real numbers to express the results of quantitat ive 
measurements, and so on. In every case, also the values of X are supposed to be 
unambiguously determined by the actual elementary state of the environment, so 
tha t X will be taken as a total function X : Q —•» E. 
In the most general case, what the user knows is not the precise value of X = 
X(UJ0), but only the fact tha t X(u>) £ F holds for some nonempty proper subset 
F of E. The basic question now reads: what can be told about the validity of 
the inclusion so = a*(ui0) e T for a given I / T C 5, T / 5 supposing that we 
know tha t X(ui0) £ F C E? From the Platonist point of view and at the level of a 
three-valued logic the answer is almost trivial: 
(i) If {u> : to e Q, a*(u) £ T} D {UJ : to £ Q : X(w) £ F}, then a*(uj0) £ T 
certainly holds. 
(ii) If {UJ : to e n, a*(uj) £ S - T} D {UJ : UJ £ fi, X(to) £ F}, then tT*(w0) £ T 
certainly does not hold, so tha t a(u0) e S — T certainly holds. 
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(iii) If neither (i) nor (ii) is the case, i.e., if there are u>i, u>2 £ Q such that 
X(LOI) £ F, X(LO2) £ F, (T*(LOI) £ T, but CT*(CJ2) ^ T, then no sure answer to the 
question whether <T*(LOO) £ T can be given on the ground of knowing that X(LOQ) G F 
holds, in other words, each such answer or decision will be charged by an uncertainty 
and possible risk resulting when applying such a decision in practice. Here we are just 
at the point where we must choose, in order to quantify and process this uncertainty 
and/or risk, between the way offered by the classical probability theory and by the 
statistical decision making theory based on these grounds, and between the D.-S. 
theory. Here we explain only the last case, referring to [3] or to some classical 
textbooks of statistical decision making theory like [10] or [4] as far as the former 
approach is concerned. 
Very roughly speaking, D.-S. theory is based on ascribing probability values, 
summing to one, to the three disjoint cases ( i ) - ( i i i ) listed below instead of the 
statistical decision theory approach, when the case (iii) is distributed among (i) 
and (ii), so tha t the decision is always "yes" or "no", but it is connected with a 
probability of error, or with a numerically quantifiable risk, when applied; the way 
how to distribute (iii) among (i) and (ii) is proposed with the aim to minimize this 
probability of error (risk). To be able to define the three probabilities mentioned 
above correctly and consistently, some formal structures over the sets Q, S and E 
should be defined. 
First, we must be able to ascribe numerical probability values to at least some 
subsets of Q,, S, and E. For the sake of technical convenience we shall suppose 
that the systems of these subsets are er-fields, nence, we shall suppose that three 
nonempty cr-fields A C V(Q), S C V(S), and £ C V(E) are given, here V(A) 
denotes the power-set over A, i.e., the system of all subsets of a set A. Throughout 
all this paper we shall suppose, to simplify our formal model, tha t the set S of all 
potential internal states of the system in question is finite and that S = V(S). The 
mappings <r* : Q —> S, X : Q —* E are supposed to be measurable in the sense that 
the inclusions {{LO : u G Q, (T*(LO) G T} : T C S} C A and {{LO : LO G Q, X(LO) G F} : 
F £ e} C A hold. Finally, a probability measure P : A —* (0,1) is defined on the sets 
from A, so tha t a (X, resp.) is a random variable defined on the probability space 
(Q,A,P) and taking its values in the measurable space (S,V(S)) ((E,e), resp.). 
An internal state s £ S is called compatible with an empirical value x £ E, if 
{LO £ Q : X(LO) = x} n {a; £ Q,, o~*(u) = s} --. 0. More generally, s is compatible with 
a set F C E of empirical states, if s is compatible with at least one empirical value 
x £ F, i.e., if {LO £ Q : X(LO) £ F} (1 {LO £ Q, <T*(LO) = s} # 0. Let e* C V(V(E)) 
be a nonempty cr-field of subsets of e and let T : Q —• e be a measurable mapping, 
i.e., {{LO £ Q : T(LO) £ Q} : Q £ e*} C A holds. So, the result of an experiment, 
measurement, observation, etc., is expressed not by an exact empirical value X(LO), 
but rather by a set (an interval, e.g.) of such values supposed to cover the exact 
value of the observed or measured quantity. The former case when these values are 
directly accessible is then defined when taking simply T(LO) = {X(LO)}, where { } 
denotes the singleton. 
Let U(LO) = U(T(LO)) C S denote the set of internal states compatible with the 
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set of empirical values J-(UJ) C E with respect to X in symbols, 
U(UJ) = U(T(u)) = (1.1) 
= {seS .{rjeQ: a*(rj) = s} n {n G fi : ^(17) 6 :F(u>)} # 0} • 
The value (supposing that {u> e Q : U(u) C T} e A holds for each T C S) 
Bel(T) = P ({u> : u> e Q, U(u>) C T}) (1,2) 
is then defined for each T C S and is called the believeability of the subset T C 
S. Under our interpretation the actual empirical value X(ui), compatible with the 
actual internal state SQ(U>) of the investigated system, is in .E(w), so that SQ(UJ) £ 
U(UJ) holds and U(ui) C T immediately implies that SQ(UI) G T. Consequently, 
the value Bel(T) defines the probability with which the case (i) above occurs, i.e. 
the case when we can be sure that SQ(U>) £ T holds. Analogously, the probability 
of the case (ii) is defined by Be^S* — T) and the probability of the case (iii) by 
1 - Bel(T) - Bel(5 - T) . The value 1 - Bel(;5 - T) is denoted by P1(T) and is 
called the plausibility of T; it defines the probability with which the possibility tha t 
SO(UJ) e T holds cannot be ultimately avoided. The values Bel(T) and P1(T) are the 
basic numerical characteristics (quantifications, degrees) of uncertainty ascribed to 
subsets of S and processed in the D.-S. theory. 
The most usual way of introducing the D.-S. theory differs from our presentation 
in two aspects. First, only the case when empirical values are directly observable 
is considered, so that U(u>) is defined by U({X(ui}). Second, not only results of 
observations, measurements, etc., are taken into consideration, but also other state-
ments concerning the environment and the system and not necessarily supported 
by empirical data , so that the data taken altogether may be confusing or logically 
inconsistent. Consequently, the relation SQ(UJ) £ U(ui) does not necessarily hold, and 
the set U(ui) can be even empty (the data are inconsistent), cf. [3,8] for a more de-
tailed discussion. This problem is solved, within the framework of the D.-S. theory, 
by avoiding the case of inconsistent data from consideration and by renormalizing 
the probabilities of the three cases ( i ) - ( i i i ) with respect to the case when the da ta 
are logically consistent, i.e., when the set U(u>) of compatible states is nonempty. 
Hence, (1.2) is replaced by the conditional probability 
Bel(T) = P ({UJ : u> £ Q, U(u) G T} / {a; : u G fi, U(w) + 0}) . (1.3) 
Very often, the D.-S. theory is presented in such a way that the sets U(ui) of states 
compatible with random data are taken as the primary point of further considera-
tions, so that all the way leading to this sets and briefly outlined above is neglected. 
As the set S is taken as finite, all what is then needed is a probability distribu-
tion over the (finite) power-set V(S), i.e., a mapping m : V(S) —*• (0, 1) such that 
m(0) < 1 and Y2ACS m(A) = 1; it is the so called basic probability assignment. 
Given T C S, Bel(T) is then simply defined by (1 - m ( 0 ) ) - x £ 0 - ^ c T m(A). 
An important feature of the model of D.-S. reasoning explained above, and this 
holds true for all the models presented till now, consists in the fact that the set 
U(X(u))) or U(J-(u)) of the states compatible with at random sampled empirical 
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value X(u>), or set T(u>) of such values, is always supposed to be at our disposal as 
a crisp set containing just all the states in question. Only under this condition we 
are able to decide, theoretically and practically, given T C S, whether the inclusion 
U(X(u>)) C T holds or not, when defining and computing the value Bel(T). However, 
if the set S is large enough (or infinite, but this case will be mostly avoided from our 
considerations below, because of technical difficulties), and if U(u>) (= U(X(u>)) = 
U(!F(u>)) must be constructed by a sequential verifying of the compatibility of every 
particular state from S with the given or obtained empirical data, the assumption 
that we are able to process actually the set U(u>) as a whole, unique, single and 
terminated object may be rather strong and hard to satisfy. It is why we propose, in 
the next chapter, a generalized formal model for the D.-S.-theory, which replaces this 
assumption by a weaker one: that we are able to decide for some but, in general, not 
for all systems of A of subsests of S, whether A contains U(u>) or not, leaving this 
question perhaps undecided for some other systems A C V(S). In the intensional 
setting, we are able to recognize some properties of the set U(u>), but not to identify 
it completely in order to be able to separate this set from no matter which other 
set(s). Obviously, if the power-sets V(T) C V(S) are among the decidable systems 
for all T C S, the model explained above immediately proves to be a special case of 
the generalized one. 
2. DEMPSTER-SHAFER MODEL OF UNCERTAINTY PROCESSING WITH 
INCOMPLETE IDENTIFICATION 
Like as in the model investigated above, our reasoning begins with a nonempty 
(and usually finite) set S of possible internal states of an investigated system and 
with a nonempty set E (perhaps a many-dimensional vector space) of empirical 
values, sampled at random and used in order to take some decision or to answer 
some question concerning the directly unobservable and inaccessible actual internal 
state of the system in question. Instead of supposing that both the actual state 
of the system and the empirical data are determined by elementary states of the 
environment in which the system as well as its observer are situated, we shall suppose 
that we have immediately at our disposal an incomplete compatibility relation over 
the spaces S and E. 
Definition 2 .1 . Incomplete compatibility relation over nonempty spaces ;S and E 
is a mapping p defined on the Cartesian product S x E and taking its values in the 
set {1, *,0} or in any set containing just three different elements of no matter which 
nature. 
The interpretation behind reads as follows. Given s E S and x E E, the equality 
p(s, x) = 1 means that the state s is compatible with the observation x in the sense 
that if the observed empirical value is x, it is possible that the system is in the 
internal state s according to the laws and dependences governing the behaviour of 
the system and of the procedures generating the observed values and binding them 
together, moreover, the subject (i.e., the observer, investigator, user) knows this 
430 I. KRAMOSIL 
fact. If p(s,x) = 0, then s is incompatible with x, i.e., the possibility that the 
system is in the state s can be logically excluded using the mentioned laws and 
dependences, and the subject knows this fact. Finally, p(s,x) = * means that the 
subject does not know whether s is compatible with x or not, perhaps because of 
lack of knowledge about the system and observations, because of lack of t ime to 
deduce the necessary conclusions, etc. 
Setting p(T, F) = inf s £T sup x e i p p(s, x) for each T C S and F C E, where sup 
and inf are taken with respect to the linear ordering 0 -4 * -< 1 of the set {1 ,* ,0} , 
the incomplete compatibility relation p can be extended to the Cartesian product 
V(S) x V(E). The extension is conservative in the sense tha t p({s}, {x}) = p(s, x) 
for each s £ S and x £ E, so that we can also define p(T, x) by p(T, {x}) and p(s, F) 
by p({s},F). The intuition behind is obvious: p(T,F) = 1 iff each state s £ T is 
compatible with at least one value x £ F, hence, no s £ T can be eliminated from 
consideration if the only fact the subject knows is that the observed empirical value 
is in F. Dually, if p(T, F) = 0, then there exists a state so £ T incompatible with 
every value x £ F, so that so must be avoided from further considerations as far as 
the actual s tate of the system is concerned, if the subject knows tha t the observed 
empirical value is in F. 
Each incomplete compatibility relation p over S x E defines two subsets of states 
compatible with an empirical value x £ E, namely U°(x) = {s E S : p(s,x) = 1}, 
and U(x) = {s £ S : p(s,x) ^ 0}. It is just the case of U(x) which reflects more 
tightly the basic idea of D.-S. theory: a state s is compatible with an empirical value 
x, if s cannot be avoided from consideration as a possible candidate to the actual 
state of the system, no mat te r whether the reasons are given by the objective nature 
of the system and its environment, or by reasons of subjective nature limiting the 
observer's decision making abilities. 
The limited subject 's abilities as far as the identification of subsets of the set S in 
general and of the sets of states compatible with given empirical da ta in particular 
are concerned are formally defined by an incomplete identification relation over the 
set S. 
D e f i n i t i o n 2 :2 . Incomplete identification relation over a nonempty set S is a map-
ping a defined on.the-Qartesian product V(S) x V(V(S)), taking its values in the 
set {1, *, 0} and such that , for each A C S and each A C V(S), a(A, A) = 1 implies 
that A £ .4--and a(A,[A) = 0 implies that A £ V(S) -A. If a(A, A) G {1,0} for each 
A C S and each A C V(S), the adjective "incomplete" is omitted and the relation 
a is called trivial. A set A C S (a system A C V(S), resp.) is called decidable with 
respect to a, if a(A, B) £ {0,1} for all B C V(S) (if a(B,A) £ {1,0} for all B C S, 
resp.). A set A C S (a system A C V(S), resp.) is called vague with respect to a, 
if a(A,B) = * for all B C V(S) (if a(B,A) = * for all B C S, resp.). The relation 
a is called simple with respect to a, if every A C V(S) is either decidable or vague. 
The relation a is called inclusively closed if the system V(T) is decidable for each 
TCS. 
Let (Q,A,P) be an abstract probability space, let" £ be a nonempty cr-field of 
subsets of E, let X be a random variable, i.e., a measurable mapping defined on the 
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probability space (Q,, A, P) and taking its values in the measurable space (E, E). If p 
is a complete compatibility relation over S X E, i.e., if p(s, x) G {1, 0} holds for each 
s £• S and x G E, and if a is an inclusively closed (incomplete) identification relation 
such that the class V(S) — {0} of subsets of S is decidable, the usual definition (1.3) 
of the believeability function can be rewritten as follows. 
Bel(T) = Pt({co : W e f i , a({s t= S : p(s, X(u)) = 1}, V(T)) = 1 } / (2.1) 
{to : u G n, a({s G S : p(s, X(u>)) = I}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}), 
where {s G S : p(s,X(u)) = 1} stands for U(u), a(U(u), V(T)) = 1 stands for 
U(u) G V(T), i.e., for U(to) C T, and a(U(u), V(S) - {0}) = 1 stands for U(u) G 
V(S) — {0}, i.e. for U(ui) / 0. A reasonable (as will be argued below) generalization 
of (1-3) and (2.1) to the case of incomplete compatibility relation and identification 
relation reads as follows. 
Def in i t ion 2 . 3 . Let S and E be nonempty sets, let S be finite, let E be a nonempty 
cr-field of subsets of E, let X be a random variable defined on the probability space 
(Q, A, P) and taking its values in the measurable space (E, E), let p be an incomplete 
compatibility relation on S x E and let a be an incomplete identification relation 
on S such tha t {a; G Q : a({s G S : p(s,X(ui)) = a}, A) = /?} G A holds for each 
a, P G {1, 0, *} and each A belonging to the minimal <r-field generated in V(V(S)) 
1 y the set {V(T) : T C S} of systems of subsets of S. Generalized believeability 
function Bel* (Bel*(x , p, a), in more detail), generated on V(S) by X, p, and a, is 
then defined, for each T C S, by the conditiona' probability 
Bel(T) = P ({to : to G Q, a({s G S : p(s, X(w)) # 0}, V(T)) = 1 } / (2.2) 
{UJ : to G n, a({s G S : p(s, X(u>)) = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}), 
if P({LO G Q : a({s G S : p(s, X(u)) = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}) > 0 holds, or by 
Bel*(T) = P ({w : u G Q, a(U(X(co)), V(T)) = 1} / (2.3) 
{a; : w G Q, a(U°(X(u,)), V(S) - {0}) = 1}) , 
when using the definitions of U(x) and U°(x) introduced above. 
At the first sight, we could consider also other variants of the original function Bel, 
e.g., replacing U by U° in the conditioned random event in (2.3) and/or replacing 
U° by U in the conditioning event, however, only the variant introduced in (2.3) 
conserves the main idea of the D.-S. reasoning. Or, (2.3) defines the probability of 
occurrence of such empirical da ta that 
(1) we are sure that the da ta are consistent as we are sure that there exists at 
least one state of the investigated system which is compatible with these data by 
virtue of the objective properties of the system and environment, not only by virtue 
of our ignorance and limited abilities, and 
(2) we are sure that every state compatible with the data in this objective sense, 
no mat te r whether we are able to verify this compatibility for every such s ta te in 
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particular, must lie in the critical set T the degree of believeability of which is to be 
numerically quantified. In other words, 
(3) Bel* (T) defines the probability of occurrence of such empirical data which 
enable to conclude, supposing that these data holds true in the actual state of the 
system and of the environment, that the actual state of the system must be in 
the critical set T, and this deduction is not charged by any kind and degree of 
uncertainty. An easy re-consideration of other possible variants of the generalized 
believeability function shows that no of them conserves this basic property of the 
D.-S. reasoning. 
3. INCOMPLETE IDENTIFICATION RELATIONS RELATED TO EQUIVA-
LENCE RELATIONS OF INDISTINGUISHABILITY 
In this chapter we shall investigate the special case of the model described above 
arising when we are not able to distinguish the set of states compatible with the 
obtained empirical values from some other subsets of S, so that we are able to 
decide that U(X) C T (U°(x) C T, resp.) holds only if this inclusion holds for 
every A C S indistinguishable from U(X) (U°(x), resp.). In order to simplify the 
situation we shall suppose, throughout this chapter, that 
(a) the set S is finite, 
(b) the compatibility relation p on S x E is complete, so that p(s, x) = 1 or 0 for 
each s £ S, x £ E and, consequently, U°(x) = U(x) for each x £ E, 
(c) the indistinguishability relation on V(S) x V(S) is defined by an equivalence 
relation ~ on V(S) x V(S), so that two subsets A, B of S are indistinguishable 
iff A ~ B holds, 
(d) the incomplete identification relation a on V(S) x V(V(S)) is such that, for 
each A, T C S, 
a(A,V(T)) = 1 iff B C T (i.e., B £ V(T)), holds for each B ~ A, 
a(A,V(S)-V($)) = l iff H ^ 0 (i.e., B £ V(S)-V(®)), holds for each B~A, 
(e) the measurable space (E,S), in which the random variable X defined on the 
probability space (Q,A,P) takes its values, is rich enough so that the set 
\JB~A{X £ E '• u(x) ~ B) i s i n ^ f o r e a c h A c s-
Denoting, for each A C S, by [A] = {B : B C S, B ~ A} the equivalence class in 
the factor-space V(S)/ ~, to which A belongs, we can rewrite the definition of Bel* 
as follows. Let T C S, then 
Bel*(T) = P({u£Q: cr(U(X(u>)), V(T)) = 1} / ( 3 1 ) 
{LJ£Q: <r(U(X(u))t V(S) - P(0)) = 1}}) = 
= P ({UJ £ 0 : B c T for all B ~ U(X(u>))} / 
{u £ Q : B # 0 for all B ~ U(X(u))}) = 
= P ({u £ Q : B £ V(T) for all B - V(X(u))} I 
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{uen-.®(£[u(x(u))]}) = 
= P ({« G n : [C(X(w))] C P(T)} / {a; 6 Q : [Ct (X(w))] -£ [0]}) = 
= P ( lW(s)/~, ^CP(T){^ 6 0 : [£t(X(u>))] = .4} / 
IWcs)/-, W " G fi : AW*))] = *}) 
For each A, H C S, Be [A] holds iff [B] = [A], so that, for each .4 G V(S)/ ~ , i.e., 
for each A = [A] for some A C 8, an easy calculation yields that 
{CJ G Q : [U(X(u))] = A} = {u G Q : [t!"(X(w))] = [A]} = (3.2) 
= {a; G fi : U(X(u)) G [A]} = {w G Q : X(w) G {x G E : U(x) G [A]}} = 
= {a; G fl : X(«) G I J B 6 [ A ] { * € .5? : r7(«) = H}} = 
= {a; G Q : X(w) G U B - A U G £ : £ ! » = B}} . 
The condition (e) above yields that UBr^A{x G E : U(x) = B} G £ holds for each 
ACS and x is a random variable defined on (£l,A,P) and taking its values in 
(E,£), hence, the subset of Q defined in (3.2) is in A, consequently, P({u G £1 : 
[U(X(u))] = A}) is defined for each A G V(S)/ ~ . Combining (3.1) and (3.2) we 
obtain that 
» _ E>46yfS)/>w,^-.[0]MC7>(T)P({^ ^ Q : WW"))] = AD , . 
e l j T,Aev(s)/~,AmP({"£V--lU(X(u))]=A}) •
 l ' - j 
This expression can be easily written in the form using the basic probability 
assignment and yielding the usual believeability function, but this time with V(S) 
playing the ro'e of the basic space S. Let m : V(V(S)) —* (0,1) be defined, for each 
A eV(S), by 
m(A) = P({ueQ: [U(X(u))] = A}) (3.4) 
if A e V(S)/ ~ , i.e., A = [A] for some A C S, m(A) = 0 otherwise. Then, 
obviously, J2Aev(s)/~ mW = 1 and 
, * m _ YJAeV(S)/~, A_m, AcV(T)
m(A) _ Y^AeV(S)/~,A?[9], AcV(T)m(A) 
{ }~ Y;Aev(s)/~,Am
m(A) - l - m ( [ 0 l ) 
(3-5) 
supposing tha t m([0]) < 1, otherwise Bel*(T) is not defined. 
The interpretation behind may be such that a more complicated system with 
several possible compatibility functions is considered. The states of this new system 
are sets of states of the original system and a state of this new system is compatible 
with some data , if it is indistinguishable, with respect to the equivalence relation ~ , 
from the actual state of the new system by which the data in question have been 
generated. 
It is perhaps worth investigating, in particular, the case when the equivalence 
relation ~ coincides with the identity relation Id on V(S) x V(S). Then, evidently, 
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[A] = {A} for each A C S and V(S)/ld = {{A} : A C S}, so that (3.1) implies 
BeY(T) = P ( { _ G n : {U(X(w))} CV(T)} / {_• G Q : {U(X(u>))} # {0}}) (3.6) 
= P ( { w G Q : Ct(X(w)) C T} / {_ G Q : «7(__ (-)) # 0}), 
hence, Bel*(T) agrees with the usual believeability function Bel(T) generated on 
V(S) by X and p, as could be expected. The condition (e) yields, in this case, that 
the probability 
P({ш ЄU 
= P({ш Єfì 
= P({ш ЄП 
U(X(ш)) = A}) = (3.7) 
X(ш) Є{xЄE: U(x) Є {A}}}) 
X(ш) є{xЄE: U(x) = A}}) 
is defined for each A C S. Denoting this value by m°(A) we easily obtain that m° 
is a basic probability assignment ofV(S) and, by (3.4), 
m([A]) = m({A}) = (3.8) 
= H({_ G Q : {U(X(u>))} = {A}}) = P({ueQ: U(X(u>)) = A}) = m°(A), 
so that 
PUl*m - E WenSVId, {A}?{<1}, {A}cV(T)m(A) 2~2A^,ACT
m°(A) f„ 0 . 
Bel ( i ) = — r = — = ———, (3.9) 
2^{A}£V(S)/ld,{A}^{H}m\-A) l^Aji<im \A) 
and this agrees with the definition of usual believeability function over V(S) through 
a basic probability assignment. 
Let us turn to the case with a general, not necessary identity, equivalence relation 
-v on V(S) x V(S), but let us suppose that the condition (e) holds for the identity 
relation Id (its validity for each equivalence relation on V(S) x V(S) then easily 
follows from the finiteness of the basic space S). Hence, the values m°(A) are defined, 
by (3.7), for each ACS. (3.2) and (3.4) then yield that, for each A = [A] G V(S)/ ~ , 
m(A) = m([A]) = P({UJ£Q: [U(X(U>))] = [A]}) = (3.10) 
= p({ujen:U(x(uj))e[A]}) = 
. = £ _ , B ~ A P ( { " e V : U(X(u,)) = _}) = ZB€Am°(B), 
so that the expression (3.5) for Bel*(T) can be expressed directly by the values of 
the basic probability assignment ra°, namely, 
_„ .*^m_ 2~2AeV(S)/~,A^],AcV(T)2~2A€Am (_j ( , 
Bel (T) - — — — . (3.11) 
2_A6P(5)/~M^[0]Z_A€-4m y^) 
Obviously, A = [A], A C V(T) implies that A C T but, in general, A C T does 
not imply that [A] C V(T), so that, if m([0]) = 0 (consequently, m°(0) = 0), 
we obtain that Bel*(T) < Bel(T) holds for each T C S. Again, this inequality 
could be intuitively expected when taking into consideration the interpretation of 
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the values in question. As can be almost immediately seen, everything what has 
been proved above for the case of identity equivalence relation Id remains valid for 
any equivalence relation ft. on V(S) x V(S) refining the relation ~ , i.e., such tha t 
A & B implies A ~ B for each A, B C S. The mapping m° will then be a basic 
probability assignment on the equivalence classes generated in V(S) by the finer 
equivalence relation « , i.e., on V(S)/ fts. 
It may be perhaps worth presenting the obtained results' once more, in the form 
of an assertion. 
T h e o r e m 3 . 1 . Let (Q, A, P) be an abstract probability space, (E, S) a measurable 
space of empirical values, X a random variable taking (f2, A, P) into (E, £), S a finite 
set, p a complete compatibility relation over SxE, and a an incomplete identification 
relation on V(S) x V(V(S)) such tha t the conditions ( a ) - ( e ) hold. Let m(A) be 
defined, for each A C V(S), by (3.4). Then, for each T C S, (3.5) holds. If 
the condition (e) is valid for the identity relation on V(S) x V(S) and if m°(A) is 
defined for each A C S by (3.7), then (3.11) holds for each T C S, If m([0]) = 0, if 
the condition (e) holds with respect to an equivalence relation ~- refining the original 
relation ~ , and if Bel**(T) is defined with respect to « , then Bel*(T) < Bel**(T) 
holds for each T C S. In particular, if &= Id, then Bel*(T) < Bel(T) holds for each 
TCS. 
4. D E M P S T E R COMBINATION RULE FOR GENERALIZED BELIEVEABIL-
ITY FUNCTIONS 
In the introductory part of this paper we describe the way of reasoning paradigmatic 
for the D.-S. theory and yielding the believeability function as the principal numer-
ical characteristic of uncertainty introduced and investigated within the framework 
of this theory. Under the presented interpretation, a subject (observer, u se r , . . . ) ob-
tains some empirical da ta of random nature concerning the investigated system and 
the environment in which this system works, and combining these data with her/his 
a priori knowledge, she/he arrives at the set U(X(ui)) of all possible internal states 
of the system compatible with the empirical data X(UJ). Given a subset T of the set 
S of all possible internal states of the system in question, the believeability Be\u(T) 
ascribed to this subset is then defined by the probability with which every state 
compatible with X(UJ) is in T, hence, as the probability with which the inclusion 
U(X(UJ)) C T holds. 
Consider, now, the case when two subjects observe the same system, the first 
one obtains empirical da ta X\(UJ) and the other one empirical data X2(to), and they 
combine these da ta separately and independently of each other, with their individual 
a priori knowledge into sets lj(xi(u;)) and U(X 2 ((*})), where U(X{(UJ)) denotes the 
set of states compatible with the da ta obtained by the i-th subject (i = 1,2). A 
third subject, to whom the results of both the former subjects represented by the set 
U(X\(UJ)) and U(X2(UJ)) are accessible, wants to combine them in a way improving 
both the particular results in the sense that the believeability ascribed to a subset 
T of S should increase supposing that the data obtained by both the subjects are 
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true and that the actual state of the investigated system is, in fact, in T. This 
is an optimistic way of combination of the particular results, a pessimistic way of 
combination when any new uncertain knowledge can only deteriorate the information 
being already at hand is also possible and worth a more detailed investigation, but 
we shall not take this possibility into consideration here. 
The most simple optimistic combination can be easily defined as follows. The 
third subject takes a state of the system as compatible with the joined data (XI(UJ), 
X2(UJ)), if it is taken as compatible by both the first and the second subjects. In 
other words, the reasons leading at least one of the original two subjects to the 
statement tha t a state is incompatible are fully accepted by the third subject (the 
believing of the third subject to what the first or the second one say expresses, in 
a sense, an optimistic point of view of the third subject). So, the third subject 
defines her/his own set U((X\(u),X2(u)) of states compatible with the joined data 
(X1(LO),X2(UJ)) by the set-theoretic joint U(XX(UJ)) n U(X2(u)), i.e. by Ui(u) n 
U2(ui), if abbreviating U(Xi(u>)) by U((u>), Then the third subject defines her/his 
own believeability function Be\ulnu2
 m the usual way, setting (!JinU2) (u) = Ui(u)C\ 
U2(LO) for all to £ Q. So, the third subject obtains that 
Bel[/ i nU2(T) = P ({to 6 Q : (Ux n U2) (u) C T} / {to £ SI : (Ui n U2) (to) -£ 0}) 
for each T C S. This new believeability function can be written in the form 
Be\u1nU2(T) = / (Belf/ j , Bel[/2) (T) and interpreted as the result of a binary opera-
tion / applied to the original believeability functions Belj/j and Bel[/2. Under some 
simplifying conditions, Be\uxr\U2 can be expressed in a more explicit way through 
Bel[/X and Be\u2. Namely, if 
(i) S is finite, so tha t rrii(A) = P({ui E & : U»(w) = A}) is defined for each Ac S 
and for both i = 1,2, 
(") E A , B e S , A n B = 0 m i ( ^ ) m 2 ( 5 ) < 1 holds, 
(iii) the set-valued random variables U\, U2, defined on the probability space 
(Q,,A,P) and taking their values in the measurable space (P(S),P(P(S))) are sta-
tistically independent, i.e., 
P ({u, e n : UX(UJ) = A, U2(UJ) = B})= (4.2) 
= P ({UJ £ Q : Ui(u>) = A}) • P ({w G Q : U2(u) = B}) 
holds for each A, B C S, then (4.1) converts into the combinatoric expression 
RJ m EA,BC5,i-.An.8CT
ml(^)m-(-?) (A „v 
Bel[/inU2(j ) = r-rr 7BT~- ^-
6) 
E^,B C 5,0^nB
m l (^ ) m 2( /3) 
In this simplified case when (4.3) holds we usually write Be\u1nu2(T) = 
(Be\u1 © Bel[/2) (T), instead of a general operation / , and the operation 0 is called 
the Dempster combination rule yielding the believeability function Be\u1nu2 as the 
result of combination of the original believeability functions Be\u1 and Bel[/2. If 
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the state space S is supposed to be finite, (4.3) is often immediately introduced 
as an abstract axiomatic definition of the Dempster combination rule applied to 
two believeability functions defined by their basic probability assignments mi, m2. 
Obviously, Be\u1r\U2
 c a n be also defined through a new probability assignment m3, 
setting 
™3(C) = Y,A,BcS,AnB=Cml(A)m2(B) (4A) 
for each C C S. 
In order to investigate a possibility how to extend the Dempster combination 
rule to generalized believeability function or how to define another rule playing the 
same or similar role let us reconsider the relation (2.1) when believeability functions 
are defined through complete compatibility relations and complete identification 
relations taken as the primary notions. So, let p\, p2 : S X E —* {0,1} be two 
complete compatibility relations corresponding to the two subjects in question and 
inducing, consecutively, two set-valued random variables U\, U2 such that U(u>) = 
U(Xt(u>)) = {seS : p(s,Xi(u)) = 1}. Hence, 
Bebj,(T) = P({L>en:o-({sCS:Pi(s,Xi(co)) = l},V(T)) = l}/ (4.5) 
/ {w G ft : ff{{, G S : Pi(s, Xt{u)) = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}) 
for all T C S and for both i = 1, 2, supposing that B e l ^ T ) is defined. Defining a 
rew compatibility relations p3 on S x (E x E) by 
p3(s, (xi,x2)) = min{pi(s, x\), p2(s, x2)} (4.6) 
for all s G S, xi, x2 G E, we easily obtain that for each such xi, x2, 
U2((xi,x2)) = {seS: p3(s, (xux2)) = 1} = (4.7) 
= {s e s: Pi(s, xi) = 1} n {s e s •. p2(s,x2) = i} = Ui(*i) n u2(x2), 
so that Bel[/1nU2(^') = Be\u3(T) can be expressed, for each T C S, by 
Be\UlnU2(T) = P({u> G Q : a({seS : p3(s, (Xi(u),X2(u>))) = l}, V(T)) = 1} / 
/{ueQ: <r({s G S : p3(s, (Xi(u),X2(u))) = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}) = (4.8) 
= P({u G Q : cr({s G S : PI(S,XI(LO)) = p2(s,X2(u>)) = 1}, V(T)) = 1 } / 
/ {u G n : <x({s G S : pi(s, X^)) = p2(s, X2(u>)) = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}), 
or, in still another notation, 
Be\UlnU2(T) = P({co C-Q : a({seS -.mm^s^^)), i=l,2} = l},V(T)) = l} / 
/{to C-Q: a({s e S : mm{Pi(s, X{(u>)), i = 1, 2} = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}). (4.9) 
This last expression for Bel[/int/2(T) seems to be the most appropriate for be-
ing immediately generalized to the case of three-valued incomplete compatibility 
functions. Consider, again, two independent subjects, but this time represented 
by incomplete compatibility functions pi, p2 : S x E —> {1,*,0}. A third subject 
uses the incomplete compatibility function P3 : S x (E x E) —>• {1,*,0} defined 
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as follows: she/he takes a state s as surely (or provably) compatible with a pair 
(x i , x2) 6 E x E of observations, iff s is surely compatible with xi for the first sub-
ject and with x2 for the second subject, hence, p3(s, (x\, X2)) = 1 iff pi(s, x,) = 1 for 
both i = 1,2. Also, the third subject takes s as surely incompatible with (xi,X2), 
if s is surely incompatible with Xi with respect to pi for at least one of the two 
original subjects, hence, p3(s, (xi,x2)) = 0 iff either pi(s, xi) = 0, or p2(s,x2) = 0. 
Finally, the third subject takes the compatibility of s with (xi,x2) as uncertain, 
i.e., p3(s, (xi,x2)) = *, in all the other cases. An easy reasoning proves that p3 
is the only three-valued extension of the two-valued case of p3 investigated above 
which preserves its two basic principles: each subject in particular decides ulti-
mately about the incompatibility of a state, on the other side, if s is considered as 
compatible with data (xi,x2), then s is in fact (at an objective level) compatible 
with xi as well as with x2, consequently, if xi and x2 are true (valid) in the actual 
state so of the system, then so is compatible with x i , x2, and (xi,x2), no matter 
whether the corresponding subjects are able to deduce this fact. E.g. , when setting 
p3(s, (xlyx2)) = min{pi(s,xi), p2(s,x2)}, if pi(s, x,) G {1,0} for both i = 1,2, and 
setting p3(s, (xi,x2)) = pi(s,Xi), if pj(s, Xj) = * for i,j = 1,2, i ^ j , then p 3 does 
not possess the property mentioned above, even if it may be also taken as reasonable 
from a certain point of view (an uncertain answer about the compatibility of a state 
given by one subject is neglected supposing that the other subject offers a certain 
answer). 
If follows immediately that the incomplete compatibility relation p 3 can be for-
mally defined by 
Ps(s, (xi,x2)) = n{pi(s,xi), p2(s,x2)}, * . ' ; . . (4-10) 
where p is the minimum operation on {1, *, 0} defined by the linear ordering 0 -< * -< 
1 on this set. In order to be able to write an analogy to the Dempster combination 
rule for generalized believeability functions in a form as close to (4.9) as possible, 
let us realize tha t the random variable Ui (U2, resp.) in (4.5) is uniquely defined by 
the (complete) compatibility function pi (p2, resp.) and by the random variable X, 
so tha t we could also write B e l ^ T ) instead of Bel{/,(T). In the case of incomplete 
compatibility functions, the same role is played by the pairs Ui(ui) = (U•*(&), Ui(ui)), 
i = 1,2, of random variables defined by 
UP(cv) = {seS:pi(s,X(uJ)) = l}, (4.11) 
Ui(u>) = {seS:Pi(s,X(u>))^Q}. (4.12) 
Obviously, if U3(u>) = (U3(u>), !J3(u;)) is generated by p3 and p3 is defined by (4.10), 
then U3°(u;) = U?(u>) n U^(u>) and U3(u>) = Ui(u) n U2(UJ). Denoting these last two 
equalities together by U3(ui) = Ui(ui)f)U2(ui), or simply by U3 = Ui C\U2, we arrive at 
the following Dempster combination rule ©* for generalized believeability functions. 
If BelzY.(T), «• = 1, 2 are defined by (2.2) with p replaced by pi and p2 and with Ui 
generated by pi according to (4.11) and (4.12), then for each T C S, 
(Bell. 0* BelJJ (T) = BelJinWa(r) = (4.13) 
= P({LO 6 Q : a({s 6 S : p{pi(s,Xi(u)) : t = 1 , 2 } ^ 0}, V(T)) = 1 } / 
/ {u e Q : a({s G S : p{Pi(s, Xi(u)) : i = 1, 2} = 1}, V(S) - {0}) = 1}). 
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In the case of generalized believeability functions with complete compatibility 
relations and with incomplete identification relations related to equivalence relations 
and investigated in Chapter 3 we have seen that these generalized believeability 
functions can be defined by usual believeability functions over appropriate factor-
spaces generated by the equivalence relation in question in the power-set V(S) over 
the state space S. A natural question arises, whether the generalized Dempster 
combination rule defined by (4.13) could be expressed, in this case, through the 
usual Dempster combination rule applied to the corresponding usual believeability 
functions over the factor-spaces in question. 
As will be proved below, the answer can be affirmative only under certain addi-
tional restrictive conditions imposed on the equivalence relation ~ defined on V(S). 
Or, when considering the original set-valued random variables U\ = U(X\(-)), U2 = 
U(X2(-)), the random event occurring when lJi(u;) n U2(u>) = A for some A C S 
can be easily defined by random events Ui(u>) = B and U2(u>) = C for appropriate 
B, C C S, namely, 
{to ett:Ui(u)nU2(u) =A}= (4.14) 
= UB,ccs,Bnc=A W e n : Ui(w) = B, U2(u) = C} . 
This relation cannot be, in general, extended to the random variables [lJi]=[lJ(^i())] 
and [lJ2] = [U(X2(-))], as the random event {w G Q : [Ui(u) n U2(u)] = A}, A G 
V(S)/ ~, cannot be defined by random events {u> e fi : [lJi(u»)] = B}, {u; G & : 
[U2(u)] = C}, for some B, C G V(S)/ ~. The reason is that if B = [B], C = [C] 
for some B,C CS, and if Hi eB,de C, i.e. if Bx ~ B and Cx ~ C hold, then 
HinCi ~ BC\C need not hold. In other words, [Ui(u>)nU2(u>)] need not be definable 
by [lJi(u;)] and [U2(u>)]. The following definition will restrict our consideration to 
the particular case when such a relation can be defined. 
Definition 4 .1 . An equivalence relation ~ on V(S) is called conservative with 
respect to a binary set operation cp on S, if for each A, B, A\, B\ C S the implication 
(A~Ai)k(B~ B2) = > <p(A, B) ~ <p(Ai,Hi) (4.15) 
holds. The relation ~ is conservative with respect to a unary set operation x on S, 
if for each A, Ai C S the implication 
A~Ai=>x(A)~x(Ai) (4.16) 
holds. 
Let the equivalence relation ~ be conservative with respect to a binary set oper-
ation cp on S. Then its extension to V(S)/ ~ is the binary operation <p° defined, for 
each [A],[B]eV(S)/~,by 
<P°([A],[B]) = [<p(A,B)]. (4.17) 
Let the equivalence relation ~ be conservative with respect to a unary set oper-
ation x o n S. Then its extension to V(S)/.~ is the unary operation x° defined, for 
each [A] G V(S)/ ~, by 
X°([A]) = [X(A)]. (4.18) 
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The relations (4.15) and (4.16) yield immediately that the definitions (4.17) and 
(4.18) are correct in the sense that the classes <p {[A], [B]) and X°([AD m V(S)/ ~ 
are defined uniquely no matter how the representatives A and B of the classes [A] 
and [B] are chosen. If <p is the operation U of set-theoretic union (operation D of 
set-theoretic joint, resp.), we shall write [A]U[J9] and [A]n[H] instead of U°([A], [B]) 
and ff([A], [B]). Let us recall that [A] n [B] = [A] = [B], if B ~ A, [A] H [B] = 0 
otherwise. 
The following trivial assertion shows that Definition 4.1 is non-trivial, i.e., non-
empty. 
Lemma 4 .1 . The identity relation = on V(S) is conservative with respect to each 
extensional binary and unary set operation on S. 
P r o o f . Let ip (x, resp.) be a binary (unary, resp.) operation on S, let 
A, B, A\, B\ C S be such that A = A\ and B = B\. The extensionality of the 
operations on S then yields that <p(A, B) = <p(A\, B\) and x(A) = x(A\) hold. • 
Theorem 4 .1 . Let (Q, A, P) be an abstract probability space, let (Ei,Ei), i = 1,2, 
be two measurable spaces of empirical values, let X;, i = 1, 2, be a random variable 
taking (Q,A,P) into (Ei,£i). Let S be a finite set, let pi, i = 1,2, be a complete 
compatibility relation over SxEi, let Ui(u>) = U(Xi(ui)) = {s G S : p(s,Xi(u>)) = 1} 
for both i = 1,2. Let a be an incomplete identification relation on V(S) x V(V(S)) 
such that the conditions (a)-(e) introduced in Chapter 3 hold for i = 1,2. Let 
rm(A) = P({u> e Q : [Ui(u>)] = A}) for each A G V(S)/ ~ and for both i = 1,2, 
let Bel^. be defined by (2.2) for i = 1,2 with p and X replaced by pi and X$, let 
Bel^ 0* Bel^2 be defined by (4.13). Let the random variables [Ui(-)j and [U2(-)], 
defined on the probability space (Q,A, P) and taking their values in the measurable 
spaces (V(S)/ ~ , V(V(S)/ ~)) , be statistically independent, i.e., let the equality 
P ({u> E V : [U\(u>)] = A, [U2(UJ)] = B}) = (4.19) 
= P({u> e Q : [U\(u)] = .4}) P({u> e V : [U2(u)] = B}) 
hold for each A, B G V(S)/ ~ . Let the equivalence relation ~ on V(S) be conser-
vative with respect to the set operation of joint on S. Then, for each T C S, 
(Bel*, 0* BelJJ (T) = Z^(s)/~^m,AnBcvJT)™M) ^(B) ^ 
1 2 E^,B6P(S)/~,>tnB^[0]ml(A)m2(#) 
supposing that T,A,Bev(S)/~,AnB?[(fj} m i ( A ) m2(H) > 0 holds, otherwise (Bel^ 0* 
Bel^2) (T) is not defined. 
P r o o f . As the compatibility relations pi, p2 are complete, Ui = (Ui,Ui) = 
(Uf, U±) for both i = 1,2. An easy calculation yields that 
(Bel t l©*Beli a ) = Bel i i n W a (T)= (4-21) 
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= P({u G Q : <r(U(X1(u)) n U(X2(u)), V(T)) = 1} / 
/ {u; G n : ff(U(X1(ui)) n Ct(X2(w)), P(S) - {0}) = 1}) = 
P ( { C J Є f i 
P({ы Eӣ 
P({ы Є 0 
[£l_(w) n 0_(w)] C V(T)} / { W £ Q : [CIi(w) n 17, (w)] / [0]}) = 
[0_(w)] n [I7_(w)] C 7>(T)} / {u, G Q : p i (« ) ] n [U2(u)] ± [0]}) = 
[0] ?-[cli(«>]n pa(«)] c^ ( r» ) 
P({u> G f. : [0] ?- [Cti(w)] n [Ct2(W)]}) 
_ E^,BgP(^)/~,-4nB7£[0],>lnBcnT)
P({ a ; € g : _̂ ______}Z___ [?/2(-^)]=g})__ 
E^ f S e P(S) /~MnB 5 . [#]P({^€a: [U i (a ; ) ]=^ , [U 2 (u ; ) ]=B}) 
_ E ^ , B g P ( S ) / ~ , ^ n ^ [ 0 ] , > l n g c P ( T )
P ( { ^ ^ : [ ^ M ] = ^ } ) P ( { ^ ^ : [ ^ 2 ( ^ ) 3 ^ } ) = 
E>i lBeT>(5)/~1>inB- i[.]P({wGfi:[I7i(a;)=^})P({a;Gn:[Cl2(a;)]=5}) 
__ E^,Bg-p(5)/~,^nB ?£[0],>tnBcP(T)
m i(v 4)m2(-4) 
£ .4.BeP(S) /~ . .AnB-<0] m l (A ) m 2(#) 
The assertion is proved. • 
When ~ is the identity relation Id on V(S), i.e. when [A] = {A} for each A C S 
and V(S)/ld = {{A} : A C S}, an easy verification yields that , defining rn'-(A) by 
m,i({A}) for each A C S and for both i = 1,2, we obtain 
(Bel_.. 0* Bel_,_) (T) = (4.22) 
E{A},{B}g-P(S)/Id, {^}n{/3}^{0}, {A}n{B}c?(T)m l (M}) m2j{I3}) 
E{A},{B}G7'(S)/Id, {A}n{B}^{0}ml({^}) m2({I^}) 
EA ,BC5, AnB^0, AnJ5CTml (A) m2(I^) 
E ^ B c s . A n B ^ m°1(A)m°2(B) 
( B e l y . ф B e Ц г J (T), 
where B e l ^ and Bel{/2 are usual believeability functions defined on V(S) by the 
usual basic probability assignments m° and m_. 
5. AN A B S T R A C T MODEL F O R INCOMPLETELY I D E N T I F I A B L E SETS 
O F COMPATIBLE STATES 
During our introductory explanation of basic ideas of D.-S. theory we started from 
an extra-mathematical interpretation and motivation for the presented ideas and 
notions, just at a secondary level mentioning the possibility of a purely abstract 
presentation of this theory. Also when investigating the abilities how to process 
the case with incompletely identifiable sets of compatible states we used a rather 
intuitive approach based, e.g., on the idea of indistinguishability of sets within the 
same equivalence class generated on V(S). An alternative, purely abstract and 
formalized model may be settled as follows. 
For the sake of simplicity we shall suppose, again, that the basic space S is finite 
so that all the probabilities under consideration will be definable by appropriate 
basic probability assignments. Let v : V(S) —• V(V(S)) be the operation of neigh­
bourhood ascribing to each A C S a, system v(A) C V(S) of subsets of S in such a 
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way that A £ u(A) holds for each A C S. The interpretation behind may be that if 
B £ u(A), then A and B are so close to each other that they are indistinguishable 
from each other in the sense that, for each A C V(S), A £ A can be proved iff B £ A 
holds for each B £ u(A), hence, iff u(A) C A holds. Consequently, u(A) immedi-
ately generalizes the equivalence class [A] introduced and investigated above. Let 
X = (SI, A, P) —* (E,e) be a random variable the values of which are the empirical 
results being to the subject's disposal, let p be a complete compatibility relation on 
S x E, let U(X(w)) = U(u) = {s £ S : p(X(u)) = 1} be defined as above. Then the 
u-induced generalized believeability function Bel|y is defined, on V(S), by 
Bel^(T) = P ({w £ Q : u(U(X(u))) C V(T)} / {a; £ ft : 0 £ u(U(X(u>)))}) (5.1) 
for each T C S supposing that P({u £ ft : 0 £ u(U(X(u)))} > 0 holds, Bel^ being 
undefined otherwise. Defining m* : V(V(S)) —* (0,1) by 
m*(A) = P ({w £ ft : u(U(X(u))) = A}) (5.2) 
for each A C V(S), we easily obtain that 
Bel^(T) = ^^nns))MA,AcV(T)rn*{A) ( g ^ 
Y,Aev(v(S)), UAm* W 
Obviously, instead of the random variable u(U(X(•))), defined on (Q,,A,P) and 
taking its values in V(V(S)), we can take the basic probability assignment defined 
on V(V(S)) as the keystone of all further considerations and constructions. 
Let us recall that if u(A) = [A] for some equivalence relation ~, then u(B) = 
u(A) for each B £ [A], i.e. for each B ~ A, however, in general the implication 
B £ u(A) => u(B) = u(A) need not hold. 
The following theorem proves that if the case of inconsistent data is strictly sep-
arable from all other cases, then each «v-induced generalized believeability function 
Bel£r can be defined by the usual believeability function Bel= for an appropriate 
set-valued random variable U : (Q.,A, P) —• (V(S), V(V(S))). Set A = {}B^A B 
for each nonempty A C V(S), set A = u(A) for each A C S, set 0 = 0 for the 
empty subset <j>* oiV(S). 
Theorem 5 .1 . Let S finite, (n,A,P), (E,e), X : (Q,A,P) —• (E,e), and 
U : E -> V(S) be as above, let u : V(S) -> V(V(S)) be such that A £ u(A) holds 
for each A C S, i>(0) = {0}, and 0 ^ u(A) for each A£Q,AcS. Then 
Bel^(T) = Bel=(T) = P ({u> £ Q : V(w) C T} / {u £ Q : U(UJ) ± 0}) (5.4) 
holds for each T C S supposing that P({u £ Q : U(u>) ^ ill}) > 0. If m* : V(V(S)) -*• 
(0,1) for each A C V(S), and if m : V(S) -> (0,1) is defined by 
m(A) = ZAcV(S)tA-=Am*(A), (5.5) 
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then m : V(S) —+ (0,1) is a basic probability assignment on S and 
, • 
p f l , » m z2ACS,A^,ACT
m(A) (,^ 
Bely(T) = — = (5.6) 
Z^lCS.^G^H^V 
for each T C S supposing that this value is defined. 
P r o o f . The conditions imposed to v yield that if 0 ^ v(U(X(u>)), then U(X(u>)) 
= U(u>) -£ 0, hence, as U(u) G v(U(u>)) and U(u) C U(w), also U(uj) -* 0. As far as 
the inverse implication is concerned, if U(u) ^ 0, then there exists 0 ^ A £ «v(!J(u;)), 
so that iv(U(w)) # {0}. Consequently, f(U(w)) -- i/(0) and 0 £ i/(U(w)) hold. 
Moreover, .v(J7(w)) C V(T) is valid iff A G P(T) is_valid for each A G u(U(u)), but 
this relation holds iff LUe^UM)^ = v(U(u>)) = U(^) C T. An easy calculation 
then yields, using (5.1), that for each T C S, 
Bel^(T) = P ({w G Q : * ( £ ! » ) C 7>(T)} / {a; G fi : 0 g i/(U(X(w)))}) = (5.7) 
= P ({w G Q : ff(X(w)) C T } / { W t O : F(X(w)) / 0}) = Bel=(T) 
whenever this conditional probability is defined. 
If m*(A) = P ( { u G f i : u(U(X(cu))) = A}) for each A C V(S), then m is evi-
dently a basic probability assignment on S. Moreover, by (5.3), 








as m*(.4) / 0 may hold only if A = u(A) for some A C S, and for each A C S the 
summation condition A C T is equivalent to iv(yl) C V(T). The theorem is proved. 
D 
An immediate corollary of Theorem 5.1 reads that under the conditions of this 
theorem the inequality Bel^(T) < Belj^(T) = Bel[/(T) holds for each T whenever the 
values are defined, more generally, Bel^(T) < Bel^2(T) holds for each T supposing 
that v\, V2 satisfy the demands of Theorem 5.1 and v\(A) D V2(A) is valid for 
each A C S. The assertion immediately follows from the obvious fact that U(u>) = 
U (UJ) C U (u>) C U (u) holds for v\, /v2 in question and for all u G ^ , here 
v = Id means that v(A) = {A} for each A C S. Hence, Beljy(T) can be interpreted 
and used as a lower approximation of Bel[/(T), consequently, if we have to decide 
whether Bel[/(T) > a holds for some threshold value a, we may arrive at the positive 
answer supposing that we prove the inequality Bel^(T) > a for some neighbouring 
operation v satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5.1. For v = Id these conditions 
are obviously fulfilled. 
It may be a matter of interest to define and briefly discuss the Dempster combi-
nation rule for the case of .v-induced generalized believeability functions Beljy , Bel^ . 
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From an apriori point of view at least the three following combination rules 0 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 
should be considered; we write Ui(u>) for U(Xi(ui)) and for both i = 1, 2. 
(Bel£. 0 1 Bel£ a) (T) = (5.9) 
= P ( V e f l : u(Ui(u)nu2(u>)) cv(T)}I{u e ti -. 0g i/(ctiHnU2(w))}), 
( B e l ^ 0 2 Be\U2) (T) = (5.10) 
= P ({to G 0 : K U i H ) n "(CI2(w)) C 7>(T)} / {a; G fi : 0 g u(Ui(co)) n v(tt2(w))}) , 
( B e l ^ © 3 B e l ^ J (T) = (5.11) 
= P ({w G fi : iv(Ui(w)) n u(U2(u)) C V(T)} / {u G ft : 0 £ .v(£ti(w)) n i / ( U 2 H ) } ) , 
where A H B = { i f l 5 : i G .4, 5 £ !3} for .4, /J C P ( 8 ) . Of course, all the 
three functions are defined only when the corresponding conditional probabilities 
are defined, i.e., when the apriori probabilities of the conditioning random events 
in question are positive. The following simple assertion shows, whether these rules 
are compatible with the usual Dempster combination rule in some simple particular 
cases; an eventual incompatibility should eliminate the corresponding combination 
rule from the scale of possible candidates to the role of Dempster combination rule 
for iv-induced generalized believeability functions. 
T h e o r e m 5.2. (a ) Let the notations of Theorem 5.1 hold, let A G u(A) hold for 
each A C S, let the random variables Xi, X2 be equivalent in the sense that for all 
u) G fi the equality 
Ui(u) = U(Xi(u)) = U2(u>) = U(X2(UJ)) (5.12) 
hold. Then 
(Bel&. ej Bel&J (T) = Bel^(T) = Bd&9(T) (5.13) 
holds for all T C S (supposing that the values are defined), if j = 1 or j = 2, but 
not, in general, for j = 3. 
( b ) Under the same notations and for u = Id, the equality 
( B e l £ & B e l £ ) (T) = (Bely. 0 B e l ^ ) (T) (5.14) 
holds for all T C S (supposing that the values are defined), if j = 1 or j = 3, but 
not, in general, for j = 2. 
P r o o f , (a) If Ui(u) = U2(u) for all u G Q, then u(Ui(u>)) = u(U2(w)\ so that 
Ui(u) n U2(ui) = UI(UJ) = U2(ui) and u(Ui(u) n U2(u)) = U(UI(UJ)) = u(U2(u$). So, 
the definitions (5.9) and (5.10) immediately imply that (5.13) holds for each T C S 
and for both j = 1,2. 
For j = 3, we have to take into consideration the subset u(Ui(u)) V\ u(U2(u>)) of 
V(S), i.e., for Ui(u) = U2(u), the subset u(Ux(u))) n u(Ui(u)) = {A n B : A, B G 
u(Ui(co))} oiV(S). Let u(Ui(u)) C V(T). Then, for each A, B G i/(Ui(w)). we 
have 4 , B eV(T), i.e., A, B C T, so that ;4 n B C T and AnB eV(T) also hold, 
consequently, U(UI(U)))UU(UI(UJ)) C V(T) is valid. Let u(Ui(uf))Hu(Ui(w)) C V(T). 
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Then {AnB : A, B e v(Ui(u))} C V(T), so that also {A n A : A 6 v(Ui(u))} = 
v(Ui(u)) C V(T) holds. So, v(Ui(u)) C V(T) iff v(Ui(J)) n ^ ( U i H ) C P(T), and 
analogously for U2, however, this equivalence is not sufficient to assure the validity 
of (5.13) for j = 3, as the following counterexample proves. 
Let v(A) = {A,S- A} for all A C S, let 0 £ Ut(u) / S hold for all u G Q and 
for both i = 1,2. Then, for both i = 1,2, 
Bel^.(T) = P({LO e Q : v(U2(u)) C V(T)} / {u G -1 : 0 g *>(U.H)}) = (5.15) 
= P({w <= .T2 : {tf*(u,), 5 - U{(u)} C V(T)} / {to e 0 : 0 g {U.(a>), 5 - U.(w)}}). 
Hence, Bel^.(T) = 1, if T = 5, and Bel^.(T) = 0 for T -*. 5. Combining Bel^ and 
Bel^-2 by the operation 0
3 we obtain, for Ui(u>) = U2(to), that 
( B e l ^ 0 3 B e l ^ ) (T) = (5.16) 
= P ({to e n : v(Ui(u)) n v(U2(u>)) c v(T)} / {u e n •. 0 g v(Ui(w)) n v(Ui(u>))}). 
But, 
v(Ui(ш))Пv(U2(ш))= (5.17) 
= {AПB:A,BЄ v(Ui(ш))} = {0, Ui(w), 5 - Uľ(ш)} , 
that 
P ({w G fi : 0 £ i/(Ui(w)) n «v(Ct2(w))}) = 0. (5.18) 
Consequently, (Bel^ 0 Bel^2) (T) is not defined for no matter which T C S, hence, 
(5.13) does not hold for j = 3. The assertion (a) is proved. 
(b) Let v = Id. Two easy calculations yield that 
(Bel™ 0 1 Bel1-?,) (T) = (5.19) 
= p({wefi: {U iHnU2H} cP(T)}/{w€Q:0${U iHnu2(u)}}) = 
= p({ueQ: Ui(u) n u2(w) cT}/{uen:®^Ui(w)n U2(u)}) 
= (Bel£ / ieBel r / 2) (T), 
(Bel l d i©
3Bel l d 2) (T) = (5.20) 
= P({ueQ: {Ui(u>)$ n {U>H} C P(T)} / {a; G fi : 0 £ { l f iH} n {Et2(w)}}) = 
= P ({u; G ft : {It-(a;) n U2(w)} C p(T)} / {w G fi : 0 g {Ui(u>) n U2H}}) = 
= (Bel£ 0 1 Bel l d) (T) = (Bely. 0 BebjJ (T) 
due to (5.19), as the equality {A}n{B} = {AnB} trivially holds for each A, B C S. 
So, (5.14) is proved for j = 1 and j = 3. 
Let Ui,.U2 be such that 0 # Ui(w) n U>H and tj^w) 5- C/2(w) hold for each 
LO e fi, let 0* denote the empty subset of V(T) to distinguish it from the empty 
subset 0 of S. Then 
(Bely, 0Belc/2) (0 )= (5.21) 
= P({w Gft : l 7 i H n U 2 H C l } / { w E f l : Ui(w) O U 2 H # 0}) = 0, 
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but 
(Bel£ ©2 Bel1-?,) (T) = (5.22) 
= P ({to E Q : {Ui(u>)} n {U2(u)} C V(T)} / { w G f i : ^ {Ui(u>)} fT {U2(u;)}}) = 
= P ({u C Q : 0* C V(T)} I {UJ E ^ : 0 g 0*}) = 1, 
as Ui(u) -- U2(u>) for all u £ Q implies that {Ui(u>)} n {U2(w)} = 0* and the 
relations 0* C V(T), 0 ^ 0 * are obviously valid. Hence, (5.14) does not hold for 
j = 2 and the proof of Theorem 5.2 is completed. • 
A natural, interesting, and immediately arising question can be formulated as 
follows. Let the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold for two random variables X\, X2, 
so that Bel^.(T) = Bel= (T) for both i = 1,2. Applying the usual Dempster com-
bination rule 0 to Bel= and Bel= we can ask, whether the identity 
Ul U2 
(Bel&. ®j B e i y (T) = (Bel= 0 Bel= ) (T) (5.23) 
for all T C S holds for some j = 1,2,3. In other terms, we can define a new 
Dempster combination rule 0 4 , setting 
(Bel&. 0 4 Bel&a) (T) = (Bel= 0 Bel= ) (T) (5.24) 
for all T C S and supposing that the values are defined and that both the random 
variables X\, X2 and the neigbourhood mapping v satisfy the conditions of Theo-
rem 5.1, and we can ask whether 0 4 is identical with 0 J for some j = 1,2,3, or, 
more generally, which are the relations between 0 4 and 0 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 . 
The identity 0 1 = 0 4 , i.e. 
(Bel^ 0 1 Bel&a) (T) = (Bel= 0 Bel= ) (T) (5.25) 
could hold only if U\(u>) n U2(UJ) = Ui(ui) n U2(u>) held for all u> G Q, hence, only 
if AnB = AnB held for all A, B C S. However, setting u(A n B) = {A D B, S} 
for fixed A, B C S such that S ^ A ^ AnB ^ Hi, S ^ B ^ AnB, and setting 
v(C) = {C} for all other C C S, in particular also v(A) = {A} and v(B) = {B}, 
we obtain that 
An B = \J{C : C £ v(An B)} = (An B)U S = S ^ An B = (5.26) 
= (|J{Ai : Ai 6 u(A)}) n (\J{Bi : Bx G u(B)}) = Jn I . 
Consequently, (5.25) cannot hold identically, so that 0 4 ^ 0 1 . 
A hypothetical identity 0 2 = 0 4 can be easily converted to the identity 
u(Ui(u>)) n u(U2(u)) = Ui(u) n U2(UJ). (5.27) 
However, for Ui and !72 such that Ui(u>) -- l72(^) and 0 ^ Ui(w) H U2(u) hold for 
each UJ E CI, and for v = Id we easily obtain that u(U\(u))) n v(U2(u)) = {UI(UJ)} n 
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{U2(w)} = 0*, and 0* = 0, but Ui(u>) n U2(UJ) = L!~i(w) n U2(u) -* 0, so that (5.27) 
cannot hold identically, consequently, ©2 ^. ©4. 
The neighbourhood mapping v : V(S) —> V(V(S)) is called consistence preserv-
ing, if for all A, B C S the following implication holds: if AC\B = 0, then ,4 in Hi = 0 
for all A1 G v(A), Hi G */(H). Consequently, if Ai n Hi ^ 0 for some Ax G i/(A) 
and some Hi G */(H), then A 0 B ^ 0. If ty = Id, then v is obviously consistence 
preserving. 
Theorem 5.3. Let the notations and conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold, let v be 
consistence preserving. Then ©3 and 0 4 are identical, so that 
(Bel&. ©3 Bel^J (T) = (Bel= © Bel=) (T) (5.28) 
holds for each T C S supposing that the believeability functions in question are 
defined. 
P r o o f . Let A, B be arbitrary subsets of S, let x G AUB = (\JiAi • Ai € v(A)}) 
n((J{Hi : Hi G v(B)}). Then there exists Ax G v(A) and Hi G v(B) such that 
x E Ai and x G H2 hold simultaneously, hence, x G Ai n Hi and, consequently, 
x G | J {Ai n Hi • Ax G iv(A), Hi G i/(H)} = i/(/l)n.v(H). (5.29) 
Let x G iv(A) n iv(H). Then there exist A\ G v(A), Hi G i/(H) such that x € A\C\B\, 
hence, x G / h and x G Hi, so that x G iv(A)n.v(B) = I f l B . Applying this result to 
Ui(u>) and U2(u) we obtain that the equality U\(u) C)U2(UJ) = v(Ui(u>)) n iv(/J2(w)) 
holds for each to E Q. 
Let 0 g v(Ui(u)) n i/(Ct3(u>)). Hence, for each C G »/(Ili(w)) n v(U2(u)), the 
inequality C ^ 0 holds and, as E!"i(w)nU2(u;) G iv(Ui(w))riiv(U2(u;)) is trivially valid 
due to the definition of the operation n, we may conclude that U\(ui) n U2(u) 7̂  0-
As Ui(u) C Ui(u) holds trivially for both i = 1, 2, we obtain that Ui(w) n lJ2(^) C 
Ui(w) nTJ2(w), hence, UI(LO) n~U2(ui) £ 0. 
The inverse implication does not hold in general, but it can be proved under the 
condition that v is consistence preserving as assumed above. Let Ui(w)C\U2(w) / 0> 
let x G S be such that 
x G Ux(u) n lJ2(u;) = (\J{A : A G KUi(w))}) n ( | J{H : B G v(U2(u))}) • (5-30) 
Then there exist A G i/(lJi(u;)) and B G ^(lJ2(u;)) such that x E A and x G H, 
hence, x G A n H, so that A n H / 0. As v is consistence preserving, we obtain 
immediately that lJi(cj) n U2(ui) ^ 0. Using the other properties of v assumed in 
Theorem 5.1 (hence, also in Theorem 5.3), we can conclude that 0 ^ v(U\(w)) l~l 
v(U2(uj)). Combining the obtained results we arrive at the conclusion that, under 
the conditions of Theorem 5.3, 0 g v(Ui(u))Hv(U2(u)) holds iff T7t(uf)ClV2(w) 7- 0. 
The inclusions 
v(Ui(u))nv(U2(u))cT, (5.31) 
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L e - | J {A n B : A £ v(U,(u)), B G ̂ (^(w))} C T, (5.32) 
hold iff AHB C T holds for each A G <v(Ui(w)), I5 £ K ^ a M ) . and this is equivalent 
to the case when {AnB : A e v(Ui(u>)), B G */(l72(u;))} C T(T) holds, hence, to 
the case when v(U\(w)) n i/(U2(w)) C "P(T) holds. Using the proved equivalence, we 
can complete the proof of Theorem 5.3 by the following easy calculation. 
Bel= B e l = ) ( T ) = (5.33) 
U 2 / 
= p([шeӣ :Ť7i(o;)ПГ72(w) C T } / { ^ Є fì : ̂ i (w) П ÏÏ2(ы) Ф 0}) = 
= P ({w Є П : ľ ( ^ i И ) П ľ ( ^ И ) C T} / {u Є fi : ľji(w) П ľľ2(u;) -é 0}) = 
= P({o;Єfì : i/(U iИ)П ï /(í t2(w))cP(T)}/{wGfì : Ø^J/(Ui(w))Пi/(U2И)}) = 
= (Bel^ 3 B e i y (T). • 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Having developed a generalized definition for believeability functions in the case 
when the sets of compatible states are not completely identifiable in the sense that 
their membership in certain classes of sets cannot be always decided, we considered, 
in more detail, the case wThen this membership question can be positively answered 
only if also seme other sets of states, close to the tested one in the sense of a 
neighbourhood relation or of an equivalence relation, are in the class of sets in 
question. We have proved that when the case of an eventual inconsistence of the 
input data is strictly and effectively separable from all other cases, the generalized 
model can be reduced to the classical one, simply considering every set of states 
inseparable from the actual set of compatible states also as a state compatible with 
the data being at our disposal. So, if Vi(A) = v2(A) for two neigbouring operations 
V\, v2 and for all A C S, in particular, if [A]-^ = [A]2 for two equivalence relations 
and for all A C S, the corresponding generalized believeability functions will be 
identical. In other words said, the abilities of believeability functions to quantify the 
uncertainty arising from our limited abilities to identify the set of compatible states 
are purely extensional and rather restricted. On the other side, when the case of 
inconsistent data cannot be strictly and effectively separated from all other cases, 
generalized believeability functions can play the role of a new tool to quantify the 
uncertainty in a Dempster-Shafer-like style also in this case. However, it is the user 
who must deduce which kind of definition of data inconsistence will be accepted; 
the problem of various definitions and interpretations of data inconsistence should 
deserve a more detailed investigation. 
A possible and perhaps fruitful path how to achieve some results in this direction 
would be to abandon the assumption of closed world accepted in this paper, accord­
ing to which S is the exhaustive list of aii possible internal states of the investigated 
system (under the interpretation introduced in Chapter 1), in favour of the idea of 
open world when S is the list of some, but not necessarily all, such states (cf. [8] 
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and [9] for more details). Under this interpretation, the case when no s tate from S 
is compatible with the input data X(u>), i.e., the case when U(X(ui)) = 0, is un-
derstood in such a way that the da ta are true or at least consistent, but the actual 
internal s tate of the system in question is out of the set S of states. Consequently, 
it is not necessary to eliminate this case from our considerations as something unde-
sirable and to re-normalize the probabilities used when believeability functions are 
defined. The only what is needed is to introduce a new state s* (fc S of the system, 
compriming all the possible states of the system not listed in S, and to conclude, if 
U(X(ui)) — 0, tha t the investigated system is in the state s*. This approach seems 
to be hopeful from the point of view of mathematical technique, as we have seen, 
tha t the greatest part of technical problems with generalized believeability functions 
arise when defining and processing conditional probabilities resulting from such a 
re-normalization, however, the theoretical limits of this approach should be carefully 
investigated. Because of the limited extent of this paper we shall postpone such an 
investigation till another occasion. 
Another possible and perhaps interesting way of generalization of the ideas and 
results presented above is to abandon the simplifying conditions that the set S of 
state is finite and tha t just the maximum cr-field V(V(S)) of subsets ofV(S) is taken 
into consideration when the measurability of all the mappings taken their values in 
V(S) is defined. The necessary modifications resulting from such a generalization 
would not bring too much new from the basic philosophical and methodological point 
^f view as applied above, but the technical apparatus would be so space and time 
consuming that it seems also better to investigate these matters separately. 
Monographies [2], [5], and [6] in the list of references presented below can serve 
as introductory guides to the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. 
(Received September 30, 1993.) 
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